Could someone please give me the citation for the work in which the
standard technique for converting recursive definitions into ordinary
ones was originally introduced?

Thanks,

Richard

–
Richard Reiner…………..rrei…@nexus.yorku.ca…………..416-538-3947

Can anyone suggest any material that looks at any sort of relationship
between relevant implication (in any relevant logic or related system)
and (any) conditional logic?? The two camps obviously have some
overlap in that they are both trying to capture a notion of
"implication" more intensional than material implication, but the
formal semantics look quite different. Is there any work describing
why relevant implication is unsuitable as a semantics for
conditionals? Or can anyone suggest any (simple) linguistic examples??

Thanks,
    Lawrence.

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                           SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT

                 State University of New York at Buffalo

                      CENTER FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE

                              announces the

 *************************************************************************
 *                                                                       *
 *     FIRST INTERNATIONAL SUMMER INSTITUTE IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE:        *
 *         Multidisciplinary Foundations of Cognitive Science            *
 *                                                                       *
 *************************************************************************

   to be held at the Amherst Campus of SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA

                             JULY 5-30, 1994  

         Robert Van Valin & Barry Smith, Institute Co-Directors
       Leonard Talmy, Director of the Center for Cognitive Science

                     HONORARY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE:

           Margaret Boden   University of Sussex, UK
         Charles Fillmore   University of California, Berkeley, USA
            Charles Frake   SUNY Buffalo, USA
         Elmar Holenstein   ETH Zurich, Switzerland
     Philip Johnson-Laird   Princeton University, USA
           Kevin Mulligan   University of Geneva, Switzerland
               Dan Slobin   University of California, Berkeley, USA
              Dan Sperber   CREA, Paris, France
              David Waltz   Thinking Machines, Cambridge, MA, USA
          Sandra Witelson   McMaster University, Canada

                    ENDORSING ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDE:

            American Association for Artificial Intelligence
                        Cognitive Science Society
                      Linguistic Society of America
                   Society for Machines and Mentality

 The Center for Cognitive Science of the State University of New York at
 Buffalo  will  present  a  four-week summer institute, July 5-30, 1994.
 This project  represents  an  important  innovation  in  the  Cognitive
 Science field; no venture of this type has been attempted before.

 The first three weeks of the Institute will be comprised of courses  at
 basic  and  advanced  levels  in  constituent  disciplines of Cognitive
 Science.  Courses will be taught  by  both  SUNY  Buffalo  faculty  and
 faculty  invited from other institutions.  The fourth week will then be
 devoted to workshops and special conferences.  Running through the four
 weeks, there will also be a special speaker series of prominent invited
 scholars.  The Institute will provide an opportunity for  many  faculty
 and  students  to get an introduction to the field of cognitive science
 and to complement courses  in  their  own  disciplines  at  their  home
 institutions.

 It is anticipated that  participants  will  include  undergraduate  and
 graduate  students,  faculty  associates, and researchers from industry
 and government.  A special effort will be made to recruit students  and
 participants  from  outside the United States, where systematic courses
 across the range of Cognitive Science disciplines are  rarely  offered.
 Participants may enroll in the courses for academic credit, if desired.
 Each course will meet for a total of 15 hours over the three weeks  and
 will carry 1 semester unit of credit.

              TENTATIVE LIST OF COURSES (as of March 1993):

                    Foundations of Cognitive Science
         Introduction to the Anthropological Study of Cognition
                 Introduction to Artificial Intelligence
                  Introduction to Cognitive Psychology
                 Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience
            Introduction to Linguistics in Cognitive Science
            Introduction to Philosophy for Cognitive Science
                    Anthropology of Knowledge Systems
                        Knowledge Representation
                              Epistemology
                              Mental Models
                     Knowledge of Language:  Syntax
                    Knowledge of Language:  Semantics
                     Natural-Language Understanding
                           Language Disorders
                          Cognitive Development
                        Neurological Development
                         Linguistic Development
                    Geographic Organization of Space
               Artificial Intelligence and Categorization
                    Language and Conceptual Structure
                      Philosophy and Categorization
                      Psychology of Problem Solving
                  Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence
                                  Logic
           Inference in Conversation, Discourse, and Narrative
            Artificial Intelligence Approaches to Perception
                     Language and Speech Perception
                        Neuropsychology of Vision
                 Philosophy and Psychology of Perception

   TENTATIVE LIST OF WORKSHOPS, SEMINARS, AND SYMPOSIA (as of March 1993):

                        Workshop on Connectionism
                         Evolution of Cognition
         The SNePS Knowledge Representation and Reasoning System
     Applied Cognitive Science: Cognitive Science in the Work-Place
                          Narrative and Deixis
              Ontology and the Cognition of Space and Time
                       Bilingualism and Cognition

                   INVITED SPEAKERS (as of March 1993)

            Thomas G. Bever   Psychology, Univ. of Rochester
Antonio Damasio (tentative)   Neuroscience, Univ. of Iowa
          Gilles Fauconnier   Linguistics, Univ. of California, San Diego
              Jerry Feldman   Computer Science, Univ. of California, Berkeley
           Janet Dean Fodor   Linguistics, CUNY Graduate Center
                Jerry Fodor   Philosophy, Rutgers Univ. & CUNY Graduate Center
              Dedre Gentner   Psychology, Northwestern Univ.
               Geoff Hinton   Computer Science, Univ. of Toronto
                Ed Hutchins   Anthropology, Univ. of California, San Diego
             Ray Jackendoff   Linguistics, Brandeis Univ.
             Michael Jordan   Artificial Intelligence, MIT
    Annette Karmiloff-Smith   Psychology, Univ. of London, UK
         Stephen M. Kosslyn   Psychology/Neuroscience, Harvard Univ.
    John Searle (tentative)   Philosophy, Univ. of California, Berkeley
        Michael Silverstein   Linguistics/Anthropology, Univ. of Chicago
       Brian Cantwell Smith   Computer Science, Xerox PARC
             Paul Smolensky   Computer Science, Univ. of Colorado, Boulder
                David Waltz   Computer Science, Thinking Machines Corp.
            Sandra Witelson   Neuroscience, McMaster Univ.

 Detailed information on  the  Institute,  including  course  offerings,
 speaker series, workshops, fees, living accommodations, and scholarship
 and travel support for students, will be available in summer 1993.

 If you wish to receive the Institute brochure, please  send  your  name
 and *postal* address (and e-mail address, if available) to either:

     Bitnet:                    cogsci94@ubvms
     Internet:                  cogsc…@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu

     or

     1994 Cognitive Science Summer Institute
     Center for Cognitive Science
     652 Baldy Hall
     SUNY Buffalo
     Buffalo, NY 14260
     USA

     (716) 645-3794
     (716) 645-3825 (fax)

FIFTH CONFERENCE ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE
                            (TARK V)

The Fifth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about
Knowledge will be held at the Asilomar Conference Center in Pacific
Grove, California, on March 13-16, 1994.  Reasoning about knowledge
has become an active area of research in a wide variety of fields,
including Artificial Intelligence, Cryptography, Distributed
Computing, Economics and Game Theory, Linguistics, Philosophy, and
Psychology.  The aim of the conference is to bring together
researchers from these fields in order to further our understanding of
interdisciplinary issues involving reasoning about knowledge and
belief.  Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:  semantic
models for knowledge and belief, bounded rationality and
resource-bounded reasoning, commonsense epistemic reasoning, knowledge
and action, applications of reasoning about knowledge and belief,
knowledge acquisition, belief revision, and learning.

You are invited  to submit 12 copies of a detailed abstract
(not a complete paper) to the program chair:

                       Ronald Fagin
                       Program Chair, TARK ’94
                       IBM Almaden Research Center
                       Dept. K53/802
                       650 Harry Road
                       San Jose, California 95120-6099, USA

Submissions will be evaluated on the basis of significance and overall
quality.  Preference will be given to papers whose topic is of
interest to an interdisciplinary audience, and all papers should be
written so that they are accessible to such an audience.  Expository
or survey papers, and papers representing previously published
research but retailored to an interdisciplinary audience, are
acceptable if they are clearly labeled as such.  Each abstract should
1) contain enough information to enable the program committee to
identify the main contribution of the work; 2) explain the importance
of the work—its novelty and its practical or theoretical
implications; and 3) include comparisons with and references to
relevant literature.  Abstracts should be no longer than ten
double-spaced pages (4,000 words).  If possible, an email address for
the contact author should be included.  Papers arriving late or
departing significantly from these guidelines risk immediate
rejection.  Economists should be aware that special arrangements are
being made with certain economics journals (in particular, with the
Journal of Economic Theory and with Games and Economic Behavior) so
that publication of an extended abstract in TARK will not prejudice
publication of a full journal version.

The deadline for submission of abstracts is September 7, 1993.
Authors will be notified of acceptance by November 10th, 1993.
Camera-ready copies of the accepted papers will be due by December 15,
1993.  One author of each accepted paper will be expected to present
the paper at the conference.  The conference will be open to all
interested attendees, and conference proceedings will be published.

Program committee:  Michael Dunn (Indiana University), Ronald Fagin
(IBM Almaden Research Center), Itzhak Gilboa (Northwestern
University), Robert Koons (University of Texas at Austin), Gerhard
Lakemeyer (University of Bonn), Barton Lipman (Queen’s University),
Judea Pearl (UCLA), Brian Skyrms (University of California at Irvine),
Mark Tuttle (DEC Cambridge Research Lab), and Lenore Zuck (Yale
University).

Conference Chair: Rohit Parikh, City University Graduate Center, 33
West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10036; phone: (212) 642-2201, (914)
834-5681; email: ri…@cunyvm.cuny.edu, ri…@cunyvm.bitnet.

Program Committee Chair: Ronald Fagin, IBM Almaden Research Center;
phone: (408) 927-1726; email: fa…@almaden.ibm.com,
fa…@almaden.bitnet.

Local Arrangements: Murray S. Mazer, DEC Cambridge Research Lab.

Publicity: Adam J. Grove, NEC Research Institute.

——————————————————————
This announcement is also available by anonymous ftp at
         external.nj.nec.com: pub/grove/tark
Postscript and LaTeX versions are available at this address also.
——————————————————————

Does anyone know an efficient algorithm for the code-breaker player in
Master Mind?  Has one been published?  Any references would be appreciated.

  Thanks,
  Peter

———————————————————————
  Peter Suber                    317/983-1214
  Department of Philosophy       bitnet:    pet…@earlham.bitnet
  Earlham College                internet:  pet…@yang.earlham.edu
  Richmond, Indiana 47374-4095   USA
———————————————————————

Hello,
it is my first posting in this newsgroup, and I am a little
confused. Being a computer scientist I also studied
Mathematical Logic (but unfortunately I forgot at most
everything but the basic concepts )

I belive that "Mathematical" stands for the fact that we use
symbols, instead of words.  Anyway, I read postings were
somebody said that Phylosofical Logic and Mathematical Logic
are not the same. Maybe I misunderstood (english is my
second language), but my idea was that Phylosofical Logic
was an *application* of Mathematical Logic. Am I wrong?

Also, one person made a difference between set theory and
logic. That’s something that I do not understand.

Wasn’t the mathematical logic able to define all the bases
of Mathematic (algebra, artimetica, set theory and so on)?

I mean, I saw the natural number created by symbols, I did
not use the "sets" before to define them (and for me it has
been something amazing). So, why there is people that
distinguish between Mathematical Logic and the other
Mathematical sciences? I mean, what I belive is that
Mathematical Logic is the root for all the sciences. Even if
it is one of the newest science. Am I wrong again?

Ciao,
        Michele

TAIT, W.W.  "Against Intuitionism: Constructive Mathematics is a part of
~~~~             Classical Mathematics".

I saw this paper referenced in a book, which gave
1983, Journal of Philosophy, 12: 173-95.   This was wrong, and not even close.

But I can’t find the paper at all.  If anyone knows of a paper with this name,
presumably by W.W.Tait, could you please alert me ?

Thanks,    Bill Taylor.          w…@math.canterbury.ac.nz
———————————————————-  
I love no one, except all those who do not love themselves.

Here’s my definition for three commonly used terms, Real, Emergent and
Myth.  First, some background:

MENTAL OBJECTS

The most solid, material, physical object in my consciousness is my body.
It’s always there, even in my dreams (in some form or another), and it
absolutely refuses to be ignored.

Yet, per materialist dogma, all body awareness arises from neuron firings
in my brain.  This makes my sum total of body experience nothing more than
a mental object.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have objects which exist only in the
mind such as the unicorn or the honest politician.

Zigging back toward the realistic end of the spectrum, we have objects
which are undeniably real such as the computer monitor or piece of paper
you are now looking at.  These objects are slightly less real than the
body, in that we can make them go away.

Zagging back to the imaginary, we have objects which we know to exist only
in the head, but which are so convincing that we think of them as real,
such as dinosaurs, the big bang and famous dead people.

Planting ourselves in the middle of the reality spectrum, and working our
way in the direction of the unreal:

          things we believe to be real, but which we’ve only heard about
               famous places we’ve never been
               famous people we’ve never seen in person
          an establish functional scientific theory
          an established but crumbling scientific theory
          a controversial new scientific theory
          a model under construction, shedding false starts as it grows
          a mere hypothesis, a what if, untested as yet

Ad nauseam.

THE POINT

Reality is a quality, not a thing.  

We think of reality as the sum total of all mental objects which have the
quality.   Yet the attachment of the quality to a given object is not an
iron clad bond.  As we learn more about the object, our perception of it’s
degree of realism will likely change.  

     The sum total of all the qualities that persist with examination can
     be referred to as Real.  

     The qualities that we didn’t see initially, but which become apparent
     with examination over a long period of time can be thought of as
     Emergent.

     The qualities that once seemed real which vanish under light can be
     thought of as Myth.  

Comments?

__

Ken Easlon
k…@holonet.net

We know that a set is recursively enumerable iff it is
diophantine. Is there a similar characterization of
recursive sets, by somehow restricting the definition
of diophanitine?

E.g. an analogue of:
   Recursively enumerable iff generated by some Turing machine
   Recursive iff generated in increasing order

Thanks.

Thanasis Tsantilas
Columbia University

  Pronouns that refer to indefinite NP’s ("I have a new car. It’s a
Porsche") have suggested that indefinite NP’s are not simply
existential quantifiers. I’m interested in indefinites that occur in
questions or commands, rather than assertions.  In some cases, it
appears that a pronoun cannot refer to these indefinites:

Do you have a car?
No.
*Can I borrow it?

Can anyone refer me to papers that discuss such examples? Thanks!